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REVIEWS
THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS. By Myres S. McDougal & William T.
Burke. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. xxv,
1226, Index. $15.00.
ALTHOUGH Myres McDougal does nothing to ease the study of interna-
tional law, scholarship is forever changed by the framework for analysis and
understanding supplied by him and such associates as William Burke. We
are deeply indebted to them. They bring to our attention, as have no others,
the many and diverse factors bearing upon law's development, and reveal that
the international lawyer must master not only the discipline of law, but also
history, philosophy, sociology and science. Discouraged by this imposing task,
one is convinced that only those as educated as McDougal and Burke are
able to deal comprehensively with the problems involved in sharing the use
of the world's oceans. The subject is complex, but if the lesser men who make
and apply the law have the patience to plow through the verbiage, ignore the
prolixity, and tolerate the repetitions in this book, they will be better equipped
to carry on their trade.' The index is excellent. Henceforth even cursory
research into the law of the sea will demand reference to this valuable work.
It is already recommended reading for all United States Naval Officers.
To one not schooled in Professor McDougal's mode of analysis in this and
companion volumes, The Public Order of the Oceans is hard reading. How-
ever, while the system it describes is indeed intricate, a basic understanding
is not so difficult as first appears. The authors presuppose that such legal
order as the-world possesses is best described as a "comprehensive process
of authoritative decision," 2 embracing the interdependent activities of men
everywhere. The law of the sea, part of this process, embodies three distinct
features: interactions among the ocean users in which the seas and their re-
sources are exploited; claims of jurisdiction and of rights of access relating
to these interactions; and decisions by authorized decision-makers responding
to these claims. These interactions, claims, and decisions relate generally to
seven major topics: internal waters; territorial seas; the boundaries between
internal and territorial waters; the width of the territorial sea; the waters
adjacent to territorial waters; the high seas; and the maintenance of public
order and the nationality of ships. The subjects are treated comprehensively
in separate chapters, each dealing with current problems of great variety and
of enormous importance to the United States, and with matters bitterly debated
at the two recent United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea. Aspects
of particular interest are the authors' use of scientific information in the dis-
cussion of fishing controversies and the control of pollution at sea; their study
1. I sympathize with the intelligent reader who remarked to me recently, "If you
look through that miasmic swamp of *** obfuscation, he does have something to say,
and it's damned interesting."
2. P. vii.
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of the confusing problems of "innocent passage," and their recognition of the
relativity of "freedom of the seas." Unfortunately no maps illustrate their
discussions.
The four Geneva Conventions resulting from the 1958 meetings, and the
discussions at the 1960 conference are closely analyzed. The authors cite
occasions when the delegates substituted confusion for precision,4 were moved
by ignorance rather than knowledge, 5 were inebriated by a "flow of traditional
words" rather than sobered by refreshing clarity6 and were motivated by
chauvinism rather than by enlightened forbearance.7 McDougal and Burke
are devastating critics. They do not condemn all that they survey, however;
for, when the Conference adopted criteria of flexibility sufficient to permit
growth and creativity, the product is praised.8 Although the parochial moti-
vations of some delegations 9 and the falsehoods of others "0 are revealed, the
precise reasons for some of the Conference failures remain hidden. Why, for
example, did a compromise proposal to establish a six-mile width for the
territorial sea fail by only one vote?"1
By vividly demonstrating the drawbacks of the "one nation-one vote prin-
ciple," the Conferences support the case against formal international meetings
devoted to the codification and restatement of controversial matters of inter-
national law. The overwhelming number of smaller nations with maximum
interests in protecting their coasts and coastal waters, but with minimum
general maritime interests, wielded influence that made it difficult to enhance
common interests.12 Many nations failed "to realize that their own long-term
interests will not be served if other states make similar extravagant claims."'13
As the authors demonstrate throughout their text, the law of the sea arises
from basic principles which embody "two sets of competing and often con-
flicting interests-those of the coastal and noncoastal states."'14 The exclusive
interests of the coastal state find expression in such doctrines as "territorial
sea," "internal waters," "continental shelf," and "hot pursuit." The inclusive
3. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, p. 1143; Convention
on the High Seas, p. 1153; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas, p. 1164; Convention on the Continental Shelf, p. 1173.
4. Pp. 875, 893 (rights of visit) ; pp. 1128-40 (requirement of "genuine link between
state and vessel").
5. P. 1002 (critique of the Fishing Convention).
6. P. 548.
7. P. 151 (Soviet-bloc claims of immunity for government owned commercial ves-
sels) ; p. 211 (claims relating to the Gulf of Aqaba) ; pp. 554-55 (bloc voting).
8. Pp. 763, 778 (flexibility in describing "freedom of the seas"); pp. 842, 1088 (pro-
visions regarding safe navigation).
9. P. 554 (Arab-Israeli dispute); p. 555 (Soviet-bloc voting); p. 778 (Soviet pro-
posal regarding naval maneuvers).







interests of other nations are expressed in such phrases as "freedom of navi-
gation and fishing," and "innocent passage." These opposing interests are
reflected in legal rules. In a companion volume 15 we are told that legal rules
conflict, frequently come in pairs, and do not point definitely toward pre-
ordained conclusions. This view of the legal order is frustrating to law stu-
dents, most frequently condemned by critics, 16 and misunderstood by lawyers.
McDougal and Burke show that to expect rules to supply automatic solutions
imposes too great a burden on man's ability to generalize, leads to rigidity in
making decisions and hinders change. The true purpose of legal rules is to
reveal significant varying factors, to predict the expectations of others and
to permit creative and adaptive, rather than arbitrary and irrational decisions.
One of the most frequently misunderstood rules is the doctrine of "freedom
of the seas." The authors show that this is not an absolute conception.
1 It
includes freedoms to navigate, exploit resources, lay cables and fly through
the airspace over the oceans-all enumerated in the High Seas Convention.
These rights are not exclusive, however, and are subject to the general policies
of other ocean users. The legality of every use of the ocean must, therefore,
be measured by what is, after final analysis, "reasonable."' 8
While the authors display scepticism about the utility of legal rules, they
are devoted adherents to those rules founded upon basic principles. One of
these is that the maintenance of public order on the high seas depends on a
clear and certain distinction between national and non-national ships.19 A
rule developed from this principle holds that each state is free to confer its
nationality upon a vessel, and that no other state can question this for reasons
of its own policy. The first state to confer its nationality on a vessel concludes
the matter. McDougal and Burke describe the efforts of some who oppose the
use of flags of convenience by requiring a genuine link 20 between ship and
state as clearly irrational,2 ' and demonstrate at great length the confusion 22
which this concept in the High Seas Convention introduces. Characteristic of
the depth of their research is the disclosure of the substance rather than the
form of the controversy over the use of flags of convenience. The dispute does
not, they find, involve standards of safety and labor as much as it does mari-
time union prerogatives, flag discrimination and subsidized shipping.23 The
15. McDouGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 56-57
(1961).
16. Fisher, Law and Policy in International Decisions, 135 ScIncE 658 (1962);
Anderson, A Critique of Professor Myres S. McDougal's Doctrine of Interpretation by
Major Purposes, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 378 (1963).
17. P. 11; pp. 757-63.
18. P. 48 and McDougal & Schlie, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Law-
ful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 660 (1955).
19. P. 1010.
20. Art. 5, Law of the Sea, Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, [1962] 13
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2312, 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
21. P. 5.
22. P. 1133.
23. Pp. 1018, 1021-26.
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legitimate interests of labor unions, they urge, are not ultimately served by
questioning the fundamental principle of the law of the sea.
To understand the process of decision, the phase of most interest to law-
yers, the authors require us to identify the people who make the decisions,
know the bases of their power, and diagnose the strategies they pursue. These
decision-makers are diverse officials of the ocean-user nations who may serve
on other occasions as claimants. Because of this dual function, the process of
decision "requires of the official the promise of reciprocity in all his decisions
and claims. ' 24 It is at this point that the authors display "the primitive struc-
ture and techniques generally characteristic of international law,"' 25 because
not all decision-makers recognize the sanction of this promise of reciprocity
and risk of retaliation. Those who make decisions after a judicious evaluation
of all facts are more likely to show this characteristic; the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen 2 6 is a notable example, but, except in
matters involving internal and territorial waters, the courts have a minor role
in developing the law of the sea. More often the decision-maker is an ad-
ministrative official in government service who is unlikely to see the disad-
vantages of pressing a claim in the international arena. A very recent con-
troversy is illustrative. The Congressman who complains about the Russian
or Cuban fishing trawlers passing through Florida waters is vitally interested
in the complaints of his constituents, but is little concerned by the risk that
restrictions upon these vessels may lead to reciprocal restraints upon United
States vessels. 27 On the other hand, officials of the Navy and the Department
of State urge caution in limiting the rights of vessels engaged in innocent
passage because they realize that unreasonable demands may have almost
immediate effect upon United States ships.
To this reviewer the book is of immense value and well worth the effort
of comprehending. However, the authors' deprecation of the value of black
letter rules is too often misunderstood by some readers who too easily leap to
the conclusion that because legal rules must be construed, they can be con-
strued arbitrarily to serve immediate ends. This is not true, because one of
the functions of a rule is to keep the exercise of discretion within bounds. This
is most easily accomplished by simply stated prescriptions. Decision-makers
of our armed forces, especially important to the law of the sea, command enor-
mous destructive power, must act quickly and under great pressure, and it is





26. P. 345 U.S. 571 (1953), quoted by authors, pp. 159-60.
27. Hearings on Russian Trawler Trafflc in U.S. Territorial Waters Before the Sub-
committee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed Services, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; Chair of International Law,
Naval War College, 1963-64.
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